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FALSE VALOR: AMENDING THE STOLEN VALOR ACT 
TO CONFORM WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S 
FRAUDULENT SPEECH EXCEPTION 
Jeffery C. Barnum* 
Abstract: The Stolen Valor Act (SVA or “the Act”) was enacted to protect against 
“fraudulent claims” of receipt of military honors or decorations. It does so by criminalizing 
false verbal or written claims regarding such awards. However, the Act failed to include all of 
the elements of an anti-fraud measure required by the First Amendment. Most critically, the 
SVA fails to require actual reliance on the part of the defrauded. Although fraud is generally 
not protected by the First Amendment, courts cannot construe the SVA as an anti-fraud 
measure if the statute does not require actual reliance. Therefore, the SVA as written has been 
subject to the higher strict scrutiny standard when challenged on First Amendment grounds. 
However, this oversight is easily remedied. Congress should amend the SVA to require that 
targets of the fraudulent claim alter their behavior based upon the false representation of 
military honors without necessarily suffering an economic injury. By modifying the SVA in 
this limited fashion, Congress will enable courts to construe the SVA as an anti-fraud 
measure while protecting against harm caused by false claims of military honors. 
INTRODUCTION 
Presenting the first military award for the Continental Army, General 
George Washington recognized those who had served with “bravery, 
fidelity and good conduct.”1 General Washington expected “those 
gallant men” awarded this badge of recognition2 would “on all occasions 
be treated with particular confidence and consideration.”3 General 
Washington also warned that “should any who are not entitled to these 
honors have the insolence to assume the badges of them they shall be 
severely punished.”4 Today, Americans generally show deference and 
                                                     
* Jeffery C. Barnum is a J.D. candidate at the University of Washington School of Law and a 
lieutenant in the United States Coast Guard. The views expressed in this Comment are those of the 
author and do not reflect an official position of the United States Coast Guard, Department of 
Homeland Security, or any other U.S. government agency. 
1. 24 GEORGE WASHINGTON, General Orders, August 7, 1782, in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745–1799, at 487 (John C. Fitzpatrick 
ed., 1938). 
2. General Washington described the badge as “a narrow piece of white [cloth] of an angular 
form . . . to be fixed to the left arm on the uniform Coat.” Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
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respect to decorated military veterans.5 
Shortly after General Washington made his pronouncement, the First 
Amendment was proposed and ratified.6 The First Amendment prohibits 
Congress from making any law “abridging the freedom of speech.”7 
Because the guarantee of freedom of speech is so “intimate to liberty,”8 
the First Amendment has profoundly impacted the functioning of 
American society.9 Although the First Amendment does not prohibit all 
government restrictions on speech,10 it allows such regulation only in 
certain limited circumstances.11 
These two values—respect for military valor and freedom of 
speech—collided when Congress enacted the Stolen Valor Act (SVA or 
“the Act”) in 2006. Although the wearing of unearned military 
decorations has been unlawful for many years,12 Congress found the 
proscription on wearing unearned decorations insufficient to protect 
against “fraudulent claims” of unearned honors.13 Congress thus enacted 
the SVA, which prohibits any false verbal or written claims regarding 
receipt of military awards.14 For example, if an individual made a false 
claim to colleagues about receiving the Purple Heart, the federal 
government could prosecute under the SVA.15 In passing the SVA, 
Congress not only sought to protect the meaning of military awards 
themselves16 but also the public who relies upon the awards’ symbolic 
meaning.17 
                                                     
5. See, e.g., Karlyn Bowman & Andrew Rugg, Op-Ed, Worth Saluting, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 
2011, at A23, available at 2011 WLNR 10765991; Clyde Haberman, Renewed Respect for the 
Military, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM (May 31, 2011, 8:30 AM), 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/renewed-respect-for-the-military. 
6. The First Amendment was proposed in 1788 and ratified in 1791. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 
SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:1, at 1-2 n.1 (2008).  
7. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
8. SMOLLA, supra note 6, § 1:1, at 1-2 n.3 (quoting Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 474 
(1920)). 
9. Id. at 1-2. 
10. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The protections afforded by the First 
Amendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may 
regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.”). 
11. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (listing categories of 
unprotected speech). 
12. Act of Feb. 24, 1923, ch. 110, 42 Stat. 1286. 
13. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2, 120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006). 
14. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
15. See id.  
16. Stolen Valor Act § 2. 
17. See infra Part I. 
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In 2010, the Ninth Circuit heard the first free speech challenge to the 
SVA and declared it facially unconstitutional as an impermissible 
restriction on free speech.18 The government defended the SVA on the 
grounds that the Act proscribes only knowingly false speech,19 which the 
Supreme Court has held lacks any constitutional value or protection.20 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument on the grounds that a recent 
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Stevens,21 did not list false 
speech as an unprotected category.22 The Ninth Circuit then examined 
each of the Stevens categories of unprotected speech and concluded that 
the speech prohibited by the SVA does not fit in any of the established 
exceptions to the First Amendment.23 
While fraud is one of the categories of unprotected speech identified 
in Stevens,24 the Ninth Circuit rejected construing the SVA as 
proscribing fraudulent speech.25 Fraudulent speech requires actual 
reliance by the listener,26 whereas the SVA does not require anything 
more than a false representation by the speaker to impose liability.27 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that an anti-fraud statute must 
protect against an economic injury.28 
This Comment argues that while the Ninth Circuit was correct in 
requiring actual reliance as a prerequisite to construing the SVA as an 
anti-fraud statute, it erred by requiring an element of pecuniary injury. 
To remedy the statutory defect identified by the Ninth Circuit, this 
Comment suggests an amendment to the SVA that will address its 
constitutional infirmities while continuing to protect the public against 
false claims of military honors. Part I considers the symbolic nature of 
military decorations, the public’s reliance on these decorations, and the 
                                                     
18. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 
3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
19. Government’s Answering Brief at 14–15, Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (No. 08-50345), 2009 WL 
3760209. 
20. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no constitutional value in 
false statements of fact.”). 
21. 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
22. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1206. 
23. Id. at 1206–14. 
24. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584. 
25. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1212. 
26. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003) (requiring 
an anti-fraud statute to include an intentional and material false statement designed to mislead the 
listener that succeeds in doing so); see also infra Part II.C. 
27. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
28. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1211–12. 
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government’s actions to protect the integrity of its symbols. Part II 
explores the SVA’s history and purpose in addition to relevant First 
Amendment jurisprudence and its application to the SVA. Part III 
examines false personation, a subset of fraud that is similar to the 
conduct proscribed by the SVA. Part IV advocates for a narrow 
amendment to the SVA that only requires a victim’s reliance as a 
precondition for liability but not a concurrent economic injury. Part IV 
also argues that a narrow amendment is possible because the SVA (as 
written or amended) conforms to other First Amendment mandates. 
I. MILITARY HONORS REPRESENT AN INDIVIDUAL’S 
HISTORY AND CHARACTER THAT INFLUENCES OTHERS’ 
BEHAVIOR 
The Stolen Valor Act prohibits false claims of military honors, 
principally because “fraudulent claims” of military decorations diminish 
the symbolic power of those awards.29 Military decorations imply certain 
personal or biographical details about the wearer that are relied upon by 
members of the public.30 And the federal government has taken steps to 
prevent misappropriation of government symbols—including military 
decorations.31 
A.  Military Decorations Express the Experience and Character of the 
Wearer 
Military decorations convey both historical and personal details about 
the wearer. The public reasonably assumes that an individual claiming a 
military decoration served in the armed forces.32 Military decorations 
may also indicate whether the claimant has served in specific situations. 
For example, an individual may display medals signifying service in 
Vietnam,33 Afghanistan,34 Iraq,35 or Korea.36 Armed forces members 
                                                     
29. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2, 120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006).  
30. See infra Part I.B. 
31. See infra Part I.C. 
32. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AWARDS MANUAL 1-7 (2006), available at 
https://awards.navy.mil/awards/webdoc01.nsf/(vwDocsByID)/DL060927142728/$file/1650.1H.pdf 
(“Civilians are not normally awarded military decorations. In most cases, non-military decorations 
are available for specific services rendered by civilians, and they are considered more appropriate 
than military decorations.” (emphasis in original)). 
33. Exec. Order No. 11,231, 30 Fed. Reg. 8665 (July 8, 1965) (authorizing the Secretary of 
Defense to create an award signifying service in Vietnam); see also Vietnam Service Medal, INST. 
HERALDRY, http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/vietnam_service.aspx (last visited July 18, 
2011). 
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may receive medals for non-combat duty, such as service in Antarctica37 
or outstanding volunteerism.38 Other awards signify participation in 
combat.39 The Purple Heart, for example, is awarded to individuals who 
receive wounds from hostile enemy action that require medical 
treatment.40 Although the Purple Heart might denote participation in 
combat, it does not characterize the wearer’s performance in combat.41 
In addition to biographical details, an award may signify exemplary 
service and thus reflect upon the wearer’s character. For example, armed 
services members receive the Distinguished Service Medal for 
“exceptionally meritorious service to the United States in a duty of great 
responsibility.”42 Of course, not all individuals have the opportunity to 
serve in positions of “great responsibility.”43 However, they may still 
earn awards such as the Legion of Merit,44 Meritorious Service Medal,45 
or a particular service achievement medal.46 
                                                     
34. Act of May 28, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-234, 118 Stat. 655; Exec. Order No. 13,363, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 70,175 (Dec. 2, 2004); see also Afghanistan Campaign Medal, INST. HERALDRY, 
http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/afghanistan_campaign.aspx (last visited July 18, 2011).  
35. 118 Stat. at 655; Exec. Order No. 13,363, 69 Fed. Reg. at 70,175; see also Iraq Campaign 
Medal, INST. HERALDRY, http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/iraq_campaign.aspx (last 
visited July 18, 2011). 
36. Exec. Order No. 10,179, 15 Fed. Reg. 7665 (Nov. 8, 1950); see also Korean Service Medal, 
INST. HERALDRY, http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/korean_service.aspx (last visited July 
18, 2011). 
37. Act of July 7, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-600, 74 Stat. 337; see also Antarctica Service Medal, 
INST. HERALDRY, http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/antarctica_service.aspx (last visited 
July 18, 2011). 
38. Exec. Order No. 12,830, 58 Fed. Reg. 4061 (Jan. 9, 1993); see also Military Outstanding 
Volunteer Service Medal, INST. HERALDRY, 
http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Awards/military_volunteer.aspx (last visited July 18, 2011). 
39. Exec. Order No. 9277, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,125 (Dec. 3, 1942) (limiting award of the Purple Heart 
to those who have been “wounded in action against an enemy of the United States”). 
40. Id.; see also DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra note 32, at 2-27 to -28. 
41. Exec. Order No. 9277, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,125 (Dec. 5, 1942) (noting only requirement for Purple 
Heart is being “wounded in action against an enemy of the United States, or as a result of an act of 
such enemy, provided such wound necessitates treatment by a medical officer”). 
42. 10 U.S.C. § 6243 (2006); see also DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra note 32, at 2-23. 
43. Although “great responsibility” is not defined, the authority to award a Distinguished Service 
Medal is generally very restricted. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra note 32, at 1-16 (reserving 
Distinguished Service Medal awarding authority to the Secretary of the Navy). Delegation of 
authority to confer lower awards is also constrained. Id. at 1-16 to -20. 
44. Awarded for “exceptionally meritorious conduct in performing outstanding services.” 10 
U.S.C. § 1121 (2006); see also DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra note 32, at 2-24. 
45. Awarded for “outstanding meritorious achievement or service to the United States.” Exec. 
Order No. 11,448, 35 Fed. Reg. 915 (Jan. 16, 1969); see also DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra note 30, at 
2-28. 
46. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra note 32, at 2-32 to -33 (establishing the criteria for the 
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Such awards have a powerful effect on public perception, reflected by 
the intense campaign waged by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth during 
the 2004 presidential campaign.47 The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth 
spent twenty-four million dollars48 alleging that Democratic Presidential 
Candidate John Kerry had not earned his military awards.49 The Swift 
Boat advertisements forced Kerry to defend the legitimacy of his 
military awards instead of simply letting him claim the symbolic power 
of his wartime decorations, which spoke to his performance in combat.50 
The symbolic power of military awards is not limited to presidential 
candidates. There are approximately twenty-two million veterans living 
in the United States,51 many of whom have earned various decorations 
throughout their service. Each veteran’s decoration symbolizes a part of 
his or her character and history. 
B.  Individuals Rely upon Claims of Decorated Military Service 
Military decorations are powerful symbols because individuals 
respond favorably to the symbol itself and frequently accord its claimant 
deference or respect. For example, wearing a military symbol such as the 
Purple Heart may enhance the credibility of a witness in a civil or 
criminal trial. In United States v. Hinkson,52 the government’s case 
rested solely on the testimony of Elven Swisher, who claimed Hinkson 
solicited the murder of three federal officials.53 While testifying, Swisher 
wore a Purple Heart medal on his lapel, an honor he claimed to have 
earned serving in the Korean War.54 Hinkson’s attorney noted that, given 
                                                     
Navy and Marine Corp Achievement medal as “sustained performance or specific achievement of a 
superlative nature”). 
47. See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, Vietnam Veterans Buy Ads to Attack Kerry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 
2004, at A16. 
48. Matthew J. Allman, Note, Swift Boat Captains of Industry for Truth: Citizens United and the 
Illogic of the Natural Person Theory of Corporate Personhood, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 388 
(2011). 
49. See, e.g., Wilgoren, supra note 47. 
50. See, e.g., Lois Romano & Jim VandeHei, Kerry Says Group Is a Front for Bush, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 20, 2004, at A01 (“Kerry, who has made his military service a centerpiece of his candidacy, 
was forced to defend his war honors . . . .”). 
51. Nat’l Ctr. for Veterans Analysis & Statistics, Profile of Veterans: 2009, DEP’T VETERANS 
AFF. 2–3 (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/SpecialReports/Profile_of_Veterans_2009_FINAL.pdf. 
52. 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 563 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2096 (2011). David 
Hinkson was accused of plotting to murder three federal officials: an Internal Revenue Service 
agent, an assistant U.S. attorney, and a federal district court judge. Id. at 1251. 
53. Id. at 1251. 
54. Id. at 1254. 
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Swisher’s 1937 birthdate, he would have been between the ages of 
thirteen and sixteen at the time of the Korean War.55 Upon further 
questioning, Swisher falsely stated that he participated in classified 
missions after the Korean War to free prisoners of war from North 
Korean camps.56 Although the trial court received further evidence 
exposing Swisher’s lies, it did not permit such evidence to go before the 
jury.57 The jury convicted Hinkson based upon Swisher’s testimony.58 
The trial court denied Hinkson’s motion for a new trial, partly 
because the judge had stricken all of the false testimony regarding the 
Purple Heart.59 The judge reasoned that because there was no evidence 
of Swisher’s claimed military decorations in the record, the false claims 
could not have influenced the jury’s decision.60 However, Swisher’s 
wearing of the Purple Heart decoration influenced the jurors’ perception 
of his credibility.61 Ben Casey, one of the jurors, stated that Swisher’s 
claims of decorated military service bolstered Swisher’s credibility.62 
Casey stated that he “relied upon the credibility of Mr. Swisher”63 in 
casting his vote to convict Hinkson.64 If Casey had known Swisher lied 
about his military record, he “would not have voted for a guilty 
verdict.”65 Casey is not the only juror who has been influenced by claims 
of decorated military service.66 
                                                     
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1256. The judge ruled that the letter from the National Personnel Management Support 
Branch of the United States Marine Corps (showing Swisher was ineligible to wear any medals) was 
not authenticated per the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. Further, the evidence would be confusing 
and, in any event, consisted of extrinsic evidence of a single incident of untruthfulness. Id. 
58. Id. at 1257. 
59. Id. at 1258. 
60. Id. 
61. Appellant’s Reply Brief at app., United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 
05-30303) (Affidavit of Ben S. Casey). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. See, e.g., Cartwright v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 665 N.E.2d 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
Cartwright was a products liability case concerning a failure of a truck tire. Id. at 367. The case 
hinged on whether the jury believed Cartwright’s own testimony about the events or the defense 
expert whose theory of the accident was incompatible with Cartwright’s testimony. Id. at 368–70. 
On the stand, Cartwright testified about his decorated military service, and the jury returned an 
eleven million dollar verdict in his favor. Id. After trial, evidence which cast serious doubt upon 
Cartwright’s claims of decorated military service served as the factual basis for a successful appeal. 
Id. at 372. 
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The United States Supreme Court recognized the effect of decorated 
military service on public perceptions and behavior in Porter v. 
McCollum.67 In Porter, the Court noted that “[o]ur Nation has a long 
tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service, 
especially for those who fought on the front lines . . . .”68 At sentencing 
for aggravated murder, Porter’s defense counsel failed to introduce any 
evidence of Porter’s heroic service during the Korean War.69 The Court 
found that this failure amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.70 
Despite the notoriously difficult standard71 for proving ineffective 
assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington,72 the Court 
vacated Porter’s death sentence and remanded for resentencing.73 In so 
doing, the Court emphasized that military decorations are powerful 
symbols and that individuals rely upon claims of military awards to form 
judgments about the character of the wearer.74 
C.  The Government Can Take Steps to Prevent the Misappropriation 
of Its Symbols 
Government symbols permeate the public sphere, providing 
individuals with information about diverse products and services such as 
banks,75 produce,76 and automobile tires.77 These symbols are very much 
                                                     
67. 558 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009) (per curiam). George Porter was convicted of aggravated 
murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 449. 
68. Id. at 455. 
69. Id. at 449. 
70. Id. at 455–56. 
71. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 
1074 nn.16–17 (2009) (collecting articles regarding the high bar of the Strickland standard and 
about the low rate of reversal due to ineffective assistance of counsel). 
72. 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (“When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness 
of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.”). 
73. Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 456. 
74. Id. at 455. 
75. When a financial institution displays the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation logo, it 
represents that the federal government will guarantee deposits at that institution up to $250,000. 12 
C.F.R. § 328.2 (2011) (regulating display of logo at insured institutions); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) 
(Supp. IV 2010) (setting the maximum deposit insurance amount at $250,000). 
76. Only foods produced according to certain guidelines may display the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture organic seal. 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006); 7 C.F.R. § 205.102 (2010) (restricting use of term 
“organic” to foods produced per USDA regulations). 
77. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration provides guidance for grading tires 
based upon the treadwear, traction, and temperature resistance of the tire. 49 C.F.R. § 575.104 
(2010). 
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like a commercial trademark, signifying the quality of the financial 
institution, the nature of the foodstuffs produced, or, in the case of 
military decorations, the character and experience of the claimant.78 
Just as a trademark owner must take care to prevent infringement of a 
trademark,79 the government must also take steps to protect its symbols. 
Otherwise, as with an infringed or abandoned trademark, the meaning of 
those symbols could be lost.80 The federal government typically protects 
its symbols through a cease-and-desist letter, notifying the offending 
party that it is misappropriating a government symbol and directing the 
party to cease its misuse of the symbol.81 If the offending party does not 
respond to the letter, the federal government may seek injunctive relief 
or criminal penalties.82 Although there are few decisions on point,83 
courts have recognized the government’s prerogative in enforcing its 
rights to control its own symbols and have enjoined the misuse of 
official government symbols protected by federal law.84 
The government may protect its symbols by proscribing their 
misappropriation, even where doing so impacts speech or expressive 
conduct. For example, in Schacht v. United States,85 the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated that the proscription on unauthorized wearing of an army 
                                                     
78. The Seventh Circuit detailed how consumers use such symbols in the trademark context: 
“Trademarks help consumers to select goods. By identifying the source of the goods, they convey 
valuable information to consumers at lower costs.” Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 
1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985). In the government context, it is not the source of the goods that is at 
issue but rather that the goods (or the individual) meet certain governmentally ordained criteria.  
79. Failure to assert trademark rights can show evidence of abandonment or acquiescence. See, 
e.g., Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Detroit Forming, Inc., 743 F.2d 1039, 1046–47 (4th Cir. 1984). 
80. Id. at 1047 (“[I]f, through failure to prosecute, a mark continually loses ‘strength’ and 
‘distinctiveness’, it will eventually hemorrhage so much that it dies as a mark.” (quoting 1 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17:5, at 780 (2d ed. 1984))). 
81. See, e.g., Marc J. Goldstrom, Possible Misleading Advertisement Regarding FDIC 
Coverage, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Jan. 22, 1999), 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/4000-9970.html (providing a sample letter to a generic 
offending firm, requesting changes to the firm’s use of the phrase “FDIC insured”). 
82. See, e.g., United States v. U.S.I.A. Homes, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 483, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) 
(seeking injunction enjoining home builder from using the company name “U.S.I.A.”—an acronym 
also representing the U.S. Information Agency). 
83. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 596 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that 
statutes regulating government symbols, such as postage stamps, currency, military uniforms, and 
military medals, “though long on the books, have never been judicially construed or even 
challenged”). 
84. U.S.I.A. Homes, 409 F. Supp. at 486 (“[T]o take a name which must tend to create a false 
impression of a governmental association in the public mind . . . supports a plain inference that the 
name was chosen precisely for that misleading purpose and that the choice is fraudulent by its very 
nature.”). 
85. 398 U.S. 58 (1970). 
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uniform passed constitutional muster.86 The Court observed that “[o]ur 
previous cases would seem to make it clear that 18 U.S.C. § 702, making 
it an offense to wear our military uniforms without authority is, standing 
alone, a valid statute on its face.”87 Courts have also recognized the 
government’s ability to protect other governmental symbols by 
regulating speech, such as restricting the use of the symbols of the 
Olympic Games88 or of the U.S. Forest Service.89 
The government has taken similar actions with regard to the 
misappropriation of military honors. Congress has proscribed the 
unauthorized wearing of military medals since 1923.90 When Congress 
became aware of an enforcement gap with regards to verbal or written 
claims of honors,91 it enacted the SVA, reaffirming its commitment to 
protecting the symbolic nature of military decorations. Additionally, the 
government has taken steps to prosecute individuals who falsely claim 
receipt of military honors.92 Thus, the government has the ability—and 
perhaps the duty—to take steps to protect its symbols, and it has done so 
with regard to military decorations. 
II. THE SVA’S PROHIBITION OF FALSE VERBAL AND 
WRITTEN CLAIMS OF MILITARY AWARDS IMPLICATES 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The government has long criminalized the unauthorized wearing of 
military medals93 because of the award’s ability to symbolize 
                                                     
86. Id. at 61. 
87. Id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). However, the Court found that the 
exception for theatrical productions, conditioned upon the actor not bringing discredit to the armed 
forces, violated the First Amendment. Id. at 63; see infra notes 145–154 and accompanying text. 
88. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536–41 (1987) (holding 
that Congress could grant exclusive use of the word “Olympic” or symbols of the Olympic Games). 
89. LightHawk, the Envtl. Air Force v. Robertson, 812 F. Supp. 1095, 1104 (W.D. Wash. 1993) 
(stating the government can likely regulate commercial uses of the Smokey the Bear image). 
90. Act of Feb. 24, 1923, ch. 110, 42 Stat. 1286. 
91. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2, 120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006) (“Federal 
law enforcement officers have limited ability to prosecute fraudulent claims of receipt of military 
decorations and medals.”). 
92. See, e.g., Northwest Crackdown on Fake Veterans in “Operation Stolen Valor,” U.S. 
ATT’Y’S OFF. W. DISTRICT WASH. (Sept. 21, 2007), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/waw/press/2007/sep/operationstolenvalor.html. 
93. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 24, 1923, ch. 110, 42 Stat. 1286 (“[T]he wearing, manufacture, or sale of 
[specific medals and badges] awarded by the War Department . . . is prohibited, except when 
authorized . . . .”). 
WLR December Barnum FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/8/2011  4:44 PM 
2011] FRAUD AND THE STOLEN VALOR ACT 851 
 
biographical details as well as personal character traits.94 The SVA goes 
further by proscribing false verbal or written claims of military 
decorations.95 Because the First Amendment prohibits Congress from 
making any law “abridging the freedom of speech,”96 the SVA’s direct 
regulation of speech raises First Amendment concerns.97 This section 
examines the First Amendment issues surrounding the SVA by 
analyzing the statute’s language, relevant First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and recent constitutional challenges to the Act. 
A. Congress Enacted the SVA to Combat False Claims of Military 
Honors Not Addressed by Existing Law 
In passing the SVA, Congress recognized that false claims of a 
particular military decoration can misappropriate the award’s symbolic 
nature even when the speaker does not wear the decoration.98 While 
Congress has long proscribed unauthorized wearing of military medals,99 
false verbal or written claims of military awards were not prohibited 
before the enactment of the SVA. Thus, an individual could avoid 
liability for falsely claiming receipt of a military decoration as long as he 
or she did not physically wear the medal.100 In 1995, for example, Kane 
County, Illinois, Judge Michael O’Brien purchased replicas of two 
Medals of Honor, engraved his name on them, and printed pamphlets 
describing fictitious acts supporting his claim to the medals.101 After his 
falsehood was discovered, O’Brien received a censure from the Illinois 
Courts Commission.102 However, because federal law at the time only 
prohibited the unauthorized wearing, manufacturing, or selling of 
                                                     
94. See supra Part I.A. 
95. Stolen Valor Act § 3. 
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
97. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the SVA 
facially unconstitutional as an impermissible direct regulation of speech), cert. granted, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210); United States v. Kepler, No. 4:11-cr-00017-JAJ, 
slip op. at 9–10 (S.D. Iowa May 31, 2011) (invalidating the SVA on overbreadth grounds), appeal 
docketed, No. 11-2278 (8th Cir. June 10, 2011); United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 
1192 (D. Colo. 2010) (holding the SVA facially unconstitutional as a content-based restriction on 
speech), argued, No. 10-1358 (10th Cir. May 12, 2011). 
98. Stolen Valor Act § 2. 
99. Act of Feb. 24, 1923, ch. 110, 42 Stat. 1286. 
100. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2000) (criminalizing only the wearing of military decorations), amended 
by 18 U.S.C. § 704(a)–(b) (2006). 
101. Linda Young, Medal Lie Is Judge’s Downfall, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 1995, § 4 
(MetroDuPage), at 1. 
102. Id. 
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military decorations,103 Mr. O’Brien never faced federal charges because 
he did not wear the replica medals.104 
Advocating for passage of the SVA, Senator Kent Conrad explained 
on the Senate floor that existing law did “not apply to individuals who 
claim to be award recipients either verbally or in writing, or to those 
who display fake medals in their offices or homes.”105 Congress enacted 
the SVA to address this enforceability gap and enable prosecution of 
those who falsely claim military honors without actually wearing the 
medals.106 
B. The SVA Directly Regulates Speech, Implicating the First 
Amendment 
The SVA provides criminal penalties for anyone who “falsely 
represents . . . verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any 
decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the 
United States . . . .”107 The SVA thus regulates speech by prohibiting 
individuals from speaking or writing about military decorations they 
have not earned,108 raising several First Amendment concerns.109 
Analyzing these First Amendment concerns is a multi-step process. The 
first step is to determine whether the statute regulates speech based upon 
its content.110 The next step is to ascertain whether the proscribed speech 
falls into a category of speech “the prevention and punishment of which 
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”111 Finally, 
one must examine the regulation to ensure it is not impermissibly 
vague112 and does not discriminate based on the viewpoint of the 
speaker.113 
                                                     
103. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (criminalizing only the wearing of military decorations), amended by 18 
U.S.C. § 704(a)–(b). 
104. Young, supra note 101. 
105. 151 CONG. REC. S12,688 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Conrad). 
106. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2, 120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006). 
107. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b). 
108. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 
3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
109. Id. 
110. Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1053 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he first step in First 
Amendment analysis has been to determine whether a statute is content-neutral or content-based.”). 
111. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
112. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997) (holding a statute void for vagueness 
under a First Amendment analysis because of its chilling effect on protected speech). 
113. See, e.g., Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) 
(“[T]he First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some 
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A content-based statute regulates speech because of its subject matter. 
For example, a law prohibiting obscene pornographic phone recordings 
qualifies as content based.114 Conversely, a government regulation that 
prohibits anyone from playing any sound above a certain decibel level is 
content neutral.115 Content-based regulations are normally presumed 
invalid because such regulation “raises the specter that the government 
may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the 
marketplace.”116 As the Court declared in Police Department of Chicago 
v. Mosley,117 “above all else, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”118 In order to pass 
constitutional muster, a content-based regulation must satisfy the strict 
scrutiny standard, which requires the government to “specifically 
identify an ‘actual problem’ in need of solving”119 and show that “the 
curtailment of free speech [is] actually necessary to the solution.”120 
Consequently, few laws restricting the content of speech survive strict 
scrutiny.121 
However, there are several classes of speech “the prevention and 
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem.”122 The government may regulate speech that falls within one 
of these classes without meeting the rigors of strict scrutiny.123 In United 
States v. Stevens, the U.S. Supreme Court held that these “well-defined 
and narrowly limited classes”124 include speech integral to criminal 
conduct,125 obscenity,126 defamation,127 incitement,128 and fraud.129 
                                                     
viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.”). 
114. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (denying First 
Amendment protection to pre-recorded phone messages based on the messages’ obscene content). 
115. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989). 
116. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 
(1991). 
117. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
118. Id. at 95. 
119. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (citing United 
States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818, 822–23 (2000)). 
120. Id. at 2738 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992)). 
121. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818 (“It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its 
content will ever be permissible.”). 
122. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942), quoted in United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). 
123. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. 
124. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571). 
125. Speech integral to criminal conduct addresses criminal conduct beyond the speech itself. It is 
“intrinsically related” to another crime, creating a “proximate link” from the speech to the 
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Although the Court suggested that its list of unprotected classes of 
speech was not finite,130 it set a high bar for discerning additional 
categories.131 The following Term in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Ass’n,132 the Court resisted attempts to either create new categories or 
expand the scope of existing ones.133 Further, it reinforced the 
“categorical” approach articulated in Stevens.134 Moreover, even if the 
speech falls into one of the Stevens categories, government regulation of 
that speech must conform to other First Amendment mandates.135 
Specifically, the statute must not chill protected speech136 or 
discriminate based upon the viewpoint of the speaker.137 
A statute chills protected speech if it encourages individuals to self-
censor their lawful speech for fear of criminal prosecution. For example, 
in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,138 the Court invalidated a 
federal statute that prohibited transmission of “indecent” or “patently 
                                                     
underlying crime. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249–51 (2002).  
126. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (limiting 
obscenity to sexually based materials). 
127. Defamation is a “false written or oral statement that damages another’s reputation.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009). 
128. Incitement is speech that tends to provoke “an immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky, 
315 U.S. at 572. 
129. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584. The Court did not list “false statements” as a stand-alone 
category, despite earlier opinions holding that false statements of fact were unprotected. See, e.g., 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False statements of fact are particularly 
valueless . . . .”); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22 (1984); 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact.”).  
130. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584–86. 
131. Id. at 1586 (“Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically 
unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.”). 
132. 564 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
133. Id. at 2734. 
134. Id. at 2733. 
135. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (“[T]hese areas of speech can, 
consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable 
content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the 
Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their 
distinctively proscribable content.” (emphasis in original)). 
136. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991) (invalidating statute on 
vagueness grounds because the speaker must guess the “contours” of the statute defining protected 
from unprotected speech). 
137. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the 
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”). 
138. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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offensive” messages to minors139 without defining the terms in the 
statute.140 The Court noted that “the many ambiguities concerning [the 
statute’s] scope . . . render it problematic for purposes of the First 
Amendment,”141 because the statute’s vagueness, coupled with its 
criminal sanctions, “may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than 
communicate.”142 Likewise, statutes prohibiting false statements about 
historical events or scientific theories have a significant capacity to deter 
otherwise “constitutionally valuable” speech because the actual truth 
may be uncertain, or resolvable only through a highly politicized process 
such as a public trial.143 In that case, a court would strike down a statute 
not for its direct regulation of speech, but for its capacity to encourage 
self-censorship.144 
Just as the government may not proscribe speech ambiguously, it may 
not regulate speech based upon the viewpoint of the speaker.145 For 
example, in Schacht v. United States, the Court stated that a federal 
law146 prohibiting the unauthorized wearing of a military uniform “is, 
standing alone, a valid statute on its face”147 but struck down another 
statute that permitted wearing military uniforms in theatrical productions 
so long as the production did not discredit the military.148 The Court 
noted that “Schacht was free to participate in any skit at the 
demonstration that praised the Army, but . . . could be convicted of a 
federal offense if his portrayal attacked the Army instead of praising 
it.”149 This constituted an impermissible restriction on the expression of 
anti-military viewpoints.150 While a blanket prohibition on wearing a 
                                                     
139. Id. at 859–60. 
140. Id. at 871. 
141. Id. at 870. 
142. Id. at 872. 
143. Eugene Volokh, Amicus Curiae Brief: Boundaries of the First Amendment’s “False 
Statements of Fact” Exception, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 343, 351–52 (2010). 
144. Id. 
145. Viewpoint discrimination is a “subset of content discrimination,” regulating speech based 
upon “agreement or disagreement with the particular position the speaker wishes to express.” 
SMOLLA, supra note 6, § 3:9, at 3-12.8. Thus, viewpoint discrimination is an “especially egregious 
form of content discrimination in which the government targets not just subject matter, but the 
particular views taken on subjects by speakers.” Id. at 3-12.9. 
146. 18 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
147. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61 (1970) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367 (1968)). 
148. Id. at 62–63 (striking down the requirement that actors must not bring discredit upon the 
armed forces to be authorized to wear a military uniform). 
149. Id. at 63. 
150. Id. 
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military uniform without authorization is permissible, a companion 
regulation that permits wearing of a uniform depending on the viewpoint 
of the wearer is unconstitutional.151 
Likewise, in LightHawk, the Environmental Air Force v. 
Robertson,152 the district court recognized the government’s significant 
property interest in the image of Smokey the Bear, yet struck down U.S. 
Forest Service regulations prohibiting non-commercial use of Smokey’s 
image that did not promote forest fire prevention.153 The court found the 
Forest Service’s restrictions to be an impermissible restriction on the 
viewpoint of the message.154 As in Schacht, the court held that the 
government’s conditioning the use of its symbol based upon how the 
symbol is employed constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint regulation.155 
In sum, if the government seeks to regulate the subject matter of 
speech, it must satisfy strict scrutiny unless the speech falls into one of 
the “historic and traditional categories [of unprotected speech] long 
familiar to the bar” articulated in Stevens.156 However, even if the 
government seeks to regulate one of these categories of unprotected 
speech, it still may not regulate in a manner that chills protected speech, 
nor may it discriminate based upon the viewpoint of the speaker. 
C. The First Amendment Does Not Protect Fraudulent Speech 
Fraud is one of the categories of proscribable speech recognized in 
Stevens.157 However, Stevens did not define fraud.158 In fact, fraud lacks 
a consistent definition.159 This is partly because fraud is both a civil and 
                                                     
151. Id. 
152. 812 F. Supp. 1095 (W.D. Wash. 1993). 
153. Id. at 1102–03. 
154. Id. at 1103. 
155. Id. at 1102. 
156. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (quoting Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF 
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004, at 112 (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf. This report defines fraud as including 
“violations of statutes pertaining to lending and credit institutions, the Postal Service, interstate 
wire, radio, television, computer, credit card, veterans benefits, allotments, bankruptcy, marketing 
agreements, commodity credit, the Securities and Exchange Commission, railroad retirement, 
unemployment, Social Security, food stamp, false personation, citizenship, passports, conspiracy, 
and claims and statements . . . .” Id.  
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a criminal offense.160 Additionally, fraudulent conduct or intent is an 
element of many other criminal offenses.161 Some judges think that fraud 
“needs no definition [as] it is as old as falsehood and as versable as 
human ingenuity,”162 yet a precise definition of fraud is essential in 
determining the scope of the fraud exception to the First Amendment 
identified in Stevens. 
The Supreme Court clarified the boundaries of the fraud exception to 
First Amendment protection in Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing 
Associates, Inc.163 In Madigan, the Illinois Attorney General sued 
telephone solicitors working on behalf of a veterans’ charity for 
fraudulent statements regarding the amount of money actually making 
its way to the charity instead of being retained by the solicitors.164 The 
Court differentiated between charitable solicitations, which are protected 
by the First Amendment,165 and fraudulent transactions, which are not.166 
To distinguish between the two classes of speech, the Court identified 
several traits of a “properly tailored fraud action.”167 First, the state must 
prove that the defendant made a materially false statement and had 
knowledge of its falsity.168 Additionally, the state must prove the 
statements were made “with the intent to mislead the listener, and 
succeeded in doing so.”169 The Court did not articulate a harm element, 
merely requiring that the fraudster intentionally and successfully mislead 
                                                     
160. Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 736–37 (1999). 
161. Id. at 731. Fraud can serve as the core criminal conduct, such as in wire fraud. Id. at 731 n.12 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994)). Additionally, certain conduct can be criminalized if it is done 
“fraudulently.” Id. at 731 n.14 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 917 (1994) (criminalizing fraudulent 
misrepresentations as Red Cross agent)). Finally, other statutes prohibit conduct when there is intent 
to defraud or the conduct is part of a “scheme or artifice to defraud.” Id. at 732 nn.17–18 (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 916 (1994) (prohibiting impersonation of 4-H club member with an “intent to defraud”) 
and 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (criminalizing mailing in furtherance of a “scheme or artifice to 
defraud”)). 
162. Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941), quoted in Podgor, supra note 160, 
at 739. 
163. 538 U.S. 600 (2003). 
164. Id. at 605–06. 
165. Id. at 611–12. 
166. Id. at 612 (“[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud.”). 
167. Id. at 620. Although Madigan addressed an Illinois statute, the Court indicated the Illinois 
statute was restating the elements of a “properly tailored” fraud action. Id. 
168. Id. Although the Madigan Court did not define “materiality,” other Supreme Court decisions 
have defined “materiality” in the context of false statements. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 
U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (“The statement must have ‘a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of 
influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)). 
169. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 620. 
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the listener.170 Thus, the Court defined a “properly tailored fraud action” 
as one that proscribes an intentional and material false statement, 
intended to mislead the victim, which in fact succeeds in doing so.171 
Accordingly, a content-based regulation will pass constitutional muster 
under the fraud exception only if it contains each of these elements as a 
predicate to liability.172 
D. Courts Are Split on Whether the SVA Impermissibly Restricts 
Speech 
Federal courts have addressed four First Amendment challenges to the 
SVA.173 In three cases, United States v. Alvarez,174 United States v. 
Strandlof,175 and United States v. Kepler,176 the constitutional challenges 
succeeded. In another, United States v. Robbins,177 the court held that the 
speech regulated by the SVA falls outside the ambit of the First 
Amendment.178 
                                                     
170. Id. However, Madigan involved fraudulent charitable contributions, wherein the misled 
listener may be induced to contribute funds to a charity. Id. at 605. Therefore, some form of injury 
may also be required. In re Witt, 583 N.E.2d 526, 531 (Ill. 1991) (listing damages as an element of 
fraud), construed in Madigan, 538 U.S. at 620. 
171. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 620. 
172. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 634 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011) (“To the extent that 
defendants also argue in favor of application of fraud principles to all knowingly false speech, we 
reject the argument, noting the Supreme Court has carefully limited the boundaries of what is 
considered fraudulent speech.”). 
173. In addition to the four cases discussed here, another case is pending in the Eleventh Circuit. 
Gary Amster was convicted of a violation of the SVA. United States v. Amster, No. 8:09-cr-263-
T26TGW, slip op. at 1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-12139 (11th Cir. May 
11, 2010). He raised a First Amendment challenge only in a post-trial motion for acquittal, merely 
asserting in a single paragraph (without citations) that the SVA violated the First Amendment. 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal at 4, Amster, No. 8:09-cr-263-T26TGW (Feb. 17, 2010). The 
district court dismissed the First Amendment challenge in a single sentence. Amster, slip op. at 1 
(Feb. 18, 2010). Amster filed an appeal with the Eleventh Circuit; however, the appeal has been 
stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez. United States v. Amster, No. 10-12139 
(11th Cir. docketed May 11, 2010). 
174. 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 
11-210). 
175. 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Colo. 2010), argued, No. 10-1358 (10th Cir. May 12, 2011).  
176. No. 4:11-cr-00017-JAJ (S.D. Iowa May 31, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-2278 (8th Cir. 
June 10, 2011). 
177. 759 F. Supp. 2d 815 (W.D. Va. 2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-4757 (4th Cir. July 29, 
2011).  
178. Id. at 817. 
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1. The Ninth Circuit Held that the First Amendment Protects Most 
False Speech, Including False Claims of Military Decorations 
Xavier Alvarez introduced himself during his inaugural speech to the 
Three Valleys Municipal Water District board by stating, “I’m a retired 
marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was 
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded many times 
by the same guy. I’m still around.”179 However, Alvarez never received 
the Medal of Honor, was never in combat, and never served in the 
Marines or in any other branch of the armed forces.180 Other than the 
self-evident statement, “I’m still around,” Alvarez’s introduction was “a 
series of bizarre lies.”181 After the FBI received a recording of the Water 
Board proceedings, the government indicted Alvarez on two counts of 
violating the SVA.182 The district court denied Alvarez’s motion to 
dismiss the charges based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of the 
SVA.183 Alvarez then pleaded guilty but preserved his constitutional 
challenge.184 
Alvarez’s constitutional challenge fared better with the Ninth 
Circuit.185 The court declared the SVA’s proscriptions on false claims 
facially unconstitutional.186 In doing so, the court looked to Stevens for 
the exclusive list of exceptions to First Amendment protections.187 The 
majority considered whether the speech prohibited by the SVA could fit 
into one of the Stevens categories, including fraud.188 In considering 
whether the SVA qualifies as an anti-fraud measure, the majority 
declared that fraud statutes “must be precisely crafted to target only 
specific false statements that are likely to cause a bona fide harm.”189 
The majority found that because the SVA did not require the 
                                                     
179. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
180. Id. at 1200–01. 
181. Id. at 1201. 
182. Id. Alvarez was charged with violating the proscription against false verbal claims. Id. 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006)). His sentence was enhanced to one year because he claimed to 
have received the Congressional Medal of Honor. Id. at 1202 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 704(c)). 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 1218. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 1202 (“[H]istoric and traditional categories . . . includ[e] obscenity, defamation, fraud, 
incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct.” (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.__, 
130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
188. Id. at 1205–12. 
189. Id. at 1211 (emphasis added). 
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government to prove detrimental reliance (or a bona fide harm), the SVA 
could not be construed as an anti-fraud measure.190 The majority also 
rejected the notion that the SVA passed constitutional muster under the 
other Stevens exceptions, specifically addressing the exceptions for 
statutes prohibiting defamation191 and speech integral to criminal 
conduct.192 Because the conduct proscribed by the SVA did not fall 
within the Stevens exceptions, it was subject to strict scrutiny,193 which 
the majority and dissent agreed the SVA could not survive.194 
However, the dissent, relying upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,195 declared that nearly all 
false speech is unprotected.196 The dissent agreed with the majority that 
“speech that matters,” such as statements about public officials,197 
rhetorical hyperbole, and fiction198 must be protected even when not 
factually accurate.199 Yet, the dissent argued that the remainder of false 
speech may be freely regulated solely due to its falsity, rejecting the 
majority’s expansive reading of the First Amendment.200 
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent centered on 
the extent of protection the First Amendment affords false speech. The 
majority hewed closely to Stevens’ categories of unprotected speech 
(and did not find knowing falsehoods among those categories),201 while 
the dissent declared that falsehoods generally lack any constitutional 
                                                     
190. Id. at 1212. 
191. Id. at 1209–11. 
192. Id. at 1212–13. 
193. Id. at 1215. The court rejected the notion that Congress may proscribe false speech simply 
because “[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless.” Id. at 1203 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988)). 
194. Id. at 1215–18; id. at 1232 n.10 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
195. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Gertz Court held that “there is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s 
interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.” Id. at 340 (quoting N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). However, Gertz was a defamation case between 
two private individuals, and Gertz’s pronouncement on the constitutional value of false speech is 
potentially overbroad. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 664 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
dismissal of writ as improvidently granted). 
196. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1222 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
197. Id. at 1221 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269–72). 
198. Id. at 1222 (citing Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970)). 
199. Id. at 1222–23. 
200. Id. at 1219, 1231. 
201. Id. at 1214 (majority opinion) (“[F]alse factual speech as a general category is not, and 
cannot be, proscribed under threat of criminal prosecution.”). See supra notes 121–133 and 
accompanying text for discussion of the Stevens exemptions. 
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value.202 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 17, 
2011.203 
2. Applying the Reasoning of Alvarez, the District of Colorado Held 
that the SVA Violates the First Amendment 
While forming a veterans’ advocacy group in Denver, Rick Strandlof 
allegedly posed as a former captain in the Marine Corps who had 
medically retired due to wounds sustained in Iraq.204 Strandlof also 
allegedly claimed receipt of a Purple Heart.205 However, Strandlof never 
saw combat, never served in the military, nor received the Purple 
Heart.206 Strandlof was charged with violating the SVA.207 The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Colorado, echoing the Alvarez 
reasoning, dismissed the charge on the ground that the SVA’s speech 
proscriptions facially violate the First Amendment.208 Although the 
government had not defended the SVA as an anti-fraud measure, the 
district court considered whether the statute may fall within the First 
Amendment’s exception for fraudulent speech.209 The court observed 
that while the statute’s sponsors might have intended the SVA to combat 
fraud,210 the statutory text does not require any showing of harm to or 
reliance by the alleged victim.211 The court held that this disqualifies the 
SVA from being an anti-fraud statute.212 The government appealed and 
the case was argued before the Tenth Circuit on May 12, 2011.213 
3. The Southern District of Iowa Held that the SVA Is 
Unconstitutionally Broad 
Jeffrey Kepler served in the United States Army for twenty-eight 
                                                     
202. Id. at 1222–23 (Bybee, J., dissenting).  
203. 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011). 
204. Complaint at 3, United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Colo. 2010) (No. 1:09-
cr-00497-REB), 2009 WL 6825857, argued, No. 10-1358 (10th Cir. May 12, 2011). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 2–3. 
207. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. 
208. Id. at 1192. 
209. Id. at 1187–88. 
210. Id. at 1188. 
211. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006) (requiring only a “false representation” on the part of the 
speaker). 
212. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1188. 
213. United States v. Strandlof, No. 10-1358 (10th Cir. argued May 12, 2011). As of the time of 
this Comment’s publication, the Tenth Circuit’s decision is still pending. 
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days, after which he was discharged for medical reasons.214 Although he 
had only been in the service a short time (and thus could not qualify for 
veteran’s benefits), Kepler allegedly applied to the Department of 
Veterans Affairs for benefits using a forged discharge certificate.215 
Kepler allegedly claimed he was awarded the Silver Star, two Bronze 
Stars, and a Purple Heart.216 Although the district court cited the Alvarez 
decision approvingly,217 it could not entirely adopt Alvarez’s reasoning; 
Kepler’s speech, unlike Xavier Alvarez’s boasting, was arguably 
fraudulent because it was used to obtain governmental benefits to which 
Kepler was not entitled.218 Nonetheless, the district court found the SVA 
facially unconstitutional219 on the ground that it unambiguously applies 
to all false representations, regardless of the speaker’s intent.220 In doing 
so, the court held that the SVA criminalizes swaths of protected speech 
and is therefore unconstitutionally overbroad.221 While the court 
discussed fraud, it declined to construe the SVA as an anti-fraud 
measure because, as noted in Alvarez222 and Strandlof,223 the statute does 
not require actual reliance.224 The government’s appeal is pending before 
the Eighth Circuit; however, the appeal has been stayed pending the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez.225 
4. The Western District of Virginia Held that the SVA Does Not 
Reach “Speech that Matters” 
Ronnie L. Robbins made several public statements regarding his 
military service during the course of his campaign for Commissioner of 
                                                     
214. Government’s Response to Motion to Dismiss at 3–4, United States v. Kepler, No. 4:11-cr-
00017-JAJ (S.D. Iowa Apr. 20, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-2278 (8th Cir. June 10, 2011). 
215. Id. at 4. 
216. Id. 
217. United States v. Kepler, No. 4:11-cr-00017-JAJ, slip op. at 8–9 (S.D. Iowa May 31, 2011). 
218. Id. at 9 (“[T]he Court notes that Defendant’s actual speech in this case is not necessarily 
protected by the First Amendment. . . . [F]raudulent speech exists beyond the aegis of First 
Amendment protection.”). 
219. Id. at 9–10. 
220. Id. at 4. 
221. Id. at 4, 9–10. 
222. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 
3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
223. United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1188 (D. Colo. 2010), argued, No. 10-
1358 (10th Cir. May 12, 2011). 
224. Kepler, slip op. at 4 n.1. 
225. United States v. Kepler, No. 11-2278 (8th Cir. docketed June 10, 2011). 
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Revenue of Dickenson County, Virginia.226 In his campaign material, 
Robbins claimed that he was a Vietnam veteran and received the 
Vietnam Campaign Medal and Vietnam Service Medal.227 Although 
Robbins did, in fact, serve in the Army, he never served overseas and 
never earned either medal.228 When indicted under the SVA, Robbins 
moved to quash the indictment on the same First Amendment grounds 
that succeeded in Alvarez and Strandlof.229 However, the district court 
rejected this argument,230 relying instead upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. that false statements are 
generally not protected by the First Amendment unless they qualify as 
“speech that matters.”231 
The district court examined several ways that false speech may 
qualify as “speech that matters.”232 First, the district court noted that 
some false speech is protected to prevent a chilling effect on otherwise 
protected speech.233 Second, the court held that some falsehoods help 
identify truthful statements234 because even false statements “bring[] 
about ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced 
by its collision with error.’”235 Finally, the court noted that some 
falsehoods must be protected because “if the dominant forces in 
government were able to police truth and falsity, partisanship could 
pervade the protection of speech.”236 The district court examined 
Robbins’ false speech and found that because Robbins uttered 
objectively verifiable facts about himself, the restriction did not chill 
otherwise protected speech.237 For the same reason, the speech did not 
                                                     
226. Superseding Indictment at 2, United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815 (W.D. Va. 
2011) (No. 2:10-cr-00006), appeal docketed, No. 11-4757 (4th Cir. July 29, 2011). 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 1, 7. 
229. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Indictment at 3, 6, Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 
815 (No. 2:10-cr-00006) (citing Alvarez and Strandlof to support the argument that the SVA is a 
content-based regulation of speech). 
230. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 
(1974)). 
231. 418 U.S. at 340–41 (describing the news media as an example of “speech that matters”). 
232. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 819–20. 
233. Id. at 820; see also supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text. 
234. Id. at 820. 
235. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY 15 (Ronald Buchanan McCallum ed., Basil Blackwell 1947) (1859)), cited with approval 
in Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 820. 
236. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 820. 
237. Id. 
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serve to clarify the truth.238 Finally, the court held that because the SVA 
targeted false factual speech, it could not serve as a vehicle for 
censorship by the political majority.239 Thus, the court concluded that the 
SVA does not proscribe “speech that matters,” and therefore does not 
proscribe false speech protected by the First Amendment.240 The court 
denied Robbins’ motion to quash the indictment, and a jury convicted 
him of violating the SVA on March 2, 2011.241 For his false claims of 
military decorations, the court sentenced Robbins to six months 
imprisonment.242 Robbins’ appeal is currently pending before the Fourth 
Circuit.243 
The federal courts have thus split on the SVA’s constitutionality. 
Some, such as the majority in Alvarez244 and the district court in 
Strandlof,245 held that because the SVA did not fall into one of the 
categories of unprotected speech, 246 the SVA must satisfy strict 
scrutiny. Both courts found the SVA did not meet that demanding 
standard.247 Others, such as the dissent in Alvarez248 and the district court 
in Robbins249 pointed to other U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which 
states that false speech does not enjoy constitutional protection unless it 
qualifies as “speech that matters.”250 One court limited its discussion of 
the scope of protection for false statements to dictum, ultimately 
invalidating the SVA on overbreadth grounds.251 The three courts that 
struck down the SVA attempted to construe the SVA as an anti-fraud 
                                                     
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 820–21. 
240. Id. at 819. 
241. Verdict, Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815 (No. 2:10-cr-00006). 
242. Amended Judgment at 1, 3, Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815 (No. 2:10-cr-00006). 
243. United States v. Robbins, No. 11-4757 (4th Cir. docketed July 29, 2011). 
244. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 
3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
245. United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1189 (D. Colo. 2010), argued, No. 10-
1358 (10th Cir. May 12, 2011). 
246. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010); see supra notes 122–
135 and accompanying text (discussing categories of proscribable speech). 
247. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1218; Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1189–92. 
248. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1222–23 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
249. United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 817–18 (W.D. Va. 2011), appeal docketed, 
No. 11-4757 (4th Cir. July 29, 2011). 
250. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no constitutional value in 
false statements of fact.”); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 
n.22 (1984). 
251. United States v. Kepler, No. 4:11-cr-00017-JAJ, slip op. at 5–7, 9–10 (S.D. Iowa May 31, 
2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-2278 (8th Cir. June 10, 2011). 
WLR December Barnum FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/8/2011  4:44 PM 
2011] FRAUD AND THE STOLEN VALOR ACT 865 
 
measure, but all three, citing Madigan, found the absence of a 
requirement for actual reliance fatal to this argument.252 
III. FRAUD DOES NOT REQUIRE A PECUNIARY HARM 
Madigan’s definition of fraud requires that the listener be misled by 
the false statement but does not require that the listener suffer a 
pecuniary harm.253 Likewise, certain statutory definitions of fraud do not 
require pecuniary harm. One example is the offense of false personation, 
which is the “crime of falsely representing oneself as another 
person . . . for the purpose of deceiving someone.”254 An individual may 
commit the crime of false personation by impersonating a law 
enforcement officer,255 or, as this Comment will argue, by impersonating 
a decorated military veteran. Most jurisdictions, as well as the U.S. 
Department of Justice, categorize the crime of false personation as a 
subset of fraud. 256 Further, states usually codify false personation 
statutes in the same section as other fraud statutes.257 
Unlike other types of fraud,258 false personation does not require a 
financial injury.259 In fact, the definition of injury in false personation 
cases is fairly broad: the societal harm begins when the fraudster 
assumes the false identity,260 and is complete when the deceived person 
                                                     
252. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1212; Kepler, slip op. at 4 n.1; United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 
2d 1183, 1188 (D. Colo. 2010), argued, No. 10-1358 (10th Cir. May 12, 2011). 
253. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003). 
254. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 822 (9th ed. 2009). 
255. See, e.g., United States v. Robbins, 613 F.2d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 1979) (affirming a 
conviction for impersonating a federal law enforcement agent). 
256. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 159. 
257. See, e.g., False Personation, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17–2 (West Supp. 2011) 
(criminalizing claiming veteran’s status when seeking employment as subset of “Deception and 
Fraud”); Improper Use of an Insignia, NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.410 (2009) (criminalizing the use of a 
veteran’s organization badge to obtain a benefit, listed under “Fraud and False Personation”); 
Criminal Impersonation in the Second Degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25 (McKinney 2010) 
(criminalizing representation of membership in an organization to obtain a benefit, listed under 
“Offenses Involving Fraud”); Wearing of Insignia with Intent to Deceive, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 
§ 1514 (2002) (criminalizing the wearing of organizational insignia to obtain a benefit, listed under 
“False Pretenses, False Personations, Cheats and Frauds”).  
258. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (2006) (criminalizing fraudulent statements made in pursuit of 
health care benefits); 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (prohibiting “schemes or artifices . . . to 
obtain . . . funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property . . . by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises”).  
259. See, e.g., State v. Messer, 91 P.3d 1191, 1193 (Kan. 2004) (requiring only the assumption of 
the false identity). 
260. This is especially true when the individual is impersonating a government official. United 
States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943) (“[T]he purpose of the [false personation] statute was 
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follows “some course he would not have pursued but for the deceitful 
conduct.”261 In this way, “a person may be defrauded although he parts 
with something of no measurable value at all.”262 Federal circuit courts 
of appeals have embraced this understanding. For example, in United 
States v. Robbins263 the defendant impersonated an FBI agent but did not 
assert the authority accorded a federal law enforcement officer or 
leverage his stolen status for any financial benefit.264 Rather, Robbins 
merely used his purloined authority to carry a gun and handcuffs in front 
of his girlfriend or into various businesses.265 The only harm was that 
“people . . . tolerated such acts and accorded some deference to 
Robbins . . . in reliance on the authority that an FBI agent possesses in 
order to carry out the duties of his profession.”266 Yet this harm was 
sufficient to support a conviction for impersonation of a federal 
official.267 Thus, false personation requires some form of reliance but 
not necessarily a pecuniary harm. 
IV. THE SVA REQUIRES ONLY MINOR REVISIONS TO 
CONFORM WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
As noted by the Alvarez,268 Strandlof,269 and Kepler270 courts, the 
SVA does not require any showing of reliance, which invalidates its 
                                                     
‘to maintain the general good repute and dignity of the [government] service itself . . . .’” (last 
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 80 (1915))). 
261. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704. 
262. Id. at 705. This broad definition of injury led to the removal of the statutory phrase “intent to 
defraud the United States or any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 912 note (2006) (Historical and Revision 
Notes) (finding the phrase “meaningless”). However, several circuit courts have found the phrase 
“meaningless” because the intent to defraud “would be present whenever the element ‘acting as [a 
federal official]’ was proven.” United States v. Wilkes, 732 F.2d 1154, 1158 (3d Cir. 1984); accord 
United States v. Robbins, 613 F.2d 688, 690–92 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 
652, 655 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
263. 613 F.2d 688. 
264. Id. at 689–90. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 692; see also United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96, 97 (7th Cir. 1960) (holding that 
carrying a gun around a rented house sufficed to sustain a false personation conviction). 
267. Robbins, 613 F.2d at 692. 
268. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 
3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
269. United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1188 (D. Colo. 2010), argued, No. 10-
1358 (10th Cir. May 12, 2011). 
270. United States v. Kepler, No. 4:11-cr-00017-JAJ, slip op. at 4 n.1 (S.D. Iowa May 31, 2011), 
appeal docketed, No. 11-2278 (8th Cir. June 10, 2011). 
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construction as an anti-fraud measure under Madigan.271 However, the 
SVA complies with the remaining Madigan factors as well as other First 
Amendment mandates. Therefore, Congress should narrowly amend the 
SVA to require reliance on the part of the listener. 
A. Congress Should Narrowly Amend the SVA to Comport with the 
Fraud Exception to the First Amendment 
When the SVA’s statutory text is juxtaposed with the Madigan 
requirements for a constitutional anti-fraud measure,272 a deficiency 
appears: the element of actual reliance. The SVA prohibits anyone from 
“falsely represent[ing] himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have 
been awarded any [military] decoration.”273 The Alvarez, Strandlof, and 
Kepler courts correctly pointed to the absence of actual reliance by the 
target of the false statement as fatal to the argument that the SVA is an 
anti-fraud measure. 274 Thus, Congress should amend the SVA to require 
reliance on the part of the listener and bring the SVA into compliance 
with the Madigan formula for constitutional anti-fraud measures.275 
Though the Alvarez court suggested that economic injury is another 
essential element of fraud missing from the SVA,276 Congress should 
only require reliance. Because the SVA prohibits a form of false 
personation,277 and false personation requires only that the deceived 
                                                     
271. The Madigan Court succinctly articulated the elements of a constitutional anti-fraud 
measure: an intentional and material false statement, designed to mislead the listener, which 
succeeds in doing so. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 
(2003). 
272. Id. 
273. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
274. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210); United States v. Kepler, No. 4:11-cr-00017-JAJ, 
slip op. at 4 n.1 (S.D. Iowa May 31, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-2278 (8th Cir. June 10, 2011); 
United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1188 (D. Colo. 2010), argued, No. 10-1358 (10th 
Cir. May 12, 2011). 
275. Rep. Joe Heck has already introduced a bill to amend the SVA. Stolen Valor Act of 2011, 
H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. (2011). Heck’s bill addresses fraudulent representation more explicitly by 
requiring the statement to be in pursuit of “anything of value.” Id. § 2. However, it does not require 
any form of reliance by the listener, suffering the same infirmity as the currently enacted version of 
the SVA. Id. Additionally, it does not recognize the panoply of non-pecuniary harms which the 
SVA was designed to prevent. Id. 
276. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1211–12 (suggesting that an economic harm is required for certain 
fraud claims). 
277. False personation is defined as falsely representing oneself as another for the purposes of 
deceit. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 822 (9th ed. 2009). Therefore, when somebody falsely 
represents they have received military honors, they are representing themselves as a decorated 
veteran, thus implicating false personation. 
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listener alter his behavior based upon the false statement,278 it is not 
necessary for the SVA to include pecuniary harm as an element of the 
offense it proscribes. The SVA prohibits a form of false personation 
because when an individual falsely claims military honors, he or she 
claims the attendant reputational enhancement as well.279 For example, 
as a result of claiming military honors, one may receive “more respect 
from neighbors, acquaintances, and potential business associates.”280 
The potential for translating this enhanced reputation into some benefit 
for the claimant is wide and varied.281 Indeed, Senator Kent Conrad, the 
Senate sponsor of the SVA, alluded to this very danger when 
introducing the SVA.282 Furthermore, like other forms of false 
personation, these violations can result in non-pecuniary injury. 
One area where violations of the SVA can result in non-pecuniary 
injury is in the judicial system. False claims to military awards can be 
detrimental to a judicial system reliant on determinations of individuals’ 
reputations. For example, a witness claiming receipt of military 
decorations may enhance his or her credibility. In Cartwright v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,283 the plaintiff claimed a wide variety of 
military honors.284 In opening and closing arguments, Cartwright’s 
attorney extolled his client’s military service, and the jury returned an 
eleven million dollar million verdict. 285 However, evidence discovered 
after trial cast serious doubt on Cartwright’s claims.286 The trial court, in 
                                                     
278. See supra Part III. 
279. See supra Part I. 
280. Volokh, supra note 143, at 353. 
281. See, e.g., United States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 217–19 (3d Cir. 1999). John Michael 
Iannone posed as a decorated Vietnam veteran and developed several relationships based on his 
veteran status. Id. Iannone capitalized on his relationships to defraud his “friends” of over $600,000. 
Id. Iannone was convicted on eight different counts of fraud. Id. at 219. 
282. 151 CONG. REC. S12,688 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Conrad) (“These 
imposters use fake medals—or claim to have medals that they have not earned—to gain credibility 
in their communities. These fraudulent acts can often lead to the perpetration of very serious 
crimes.”). 
283. 665 N.E.2d 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). Cartwright was a products liability case concerning a 
failure of a truck tire. Id. at 367. The case hinged on whether the jury believed Cartwright’s own 
testimony about the events, or the defense expert whose theory of the accident was incompatible 
with Cartwright’s timeline of events. Id. at 368–70. 
284. Id. at 368. 
285. Id. at 370. 
286. Id. After the trial, Goodyear’s counsel apparently received a letter from the United States 
Army disputing Cartwright’s military history. Id. at 372. Goodyear’s counsel subpoenaed 
Cartwright’s military record, which served as the factual foundation for the subsequent successful 
appeal. Id. 
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considering a motion to set aside the verdict, held that Cartwright’s 
purported military service and heroism were “irrelevant and 
immaterial.”287 However, the appellate court reversed, stating that claims 
of military valor could not be considered irrelevant or immaterial to the 
jury’s decision where the witness’s credibility was crucial to the 
verdict.288 In another case, a juror affirmatively stated that wearing of a 
Purple Heart enhanced the witness’s credibility.289 
Because falsely claiming military decorations is a form of false 
personation which could result in a non-pecuniary injury, an amended 
SVA need only require that deceived listeners follow some “course 
[they] would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct.”290 The 
amended provision could prohibit knowing false representations about 
receipt of military decorations that cause another to act in reliance on the 
false representation. Such an amendment would satisfy all of the 
Madigan factors defining an anti-fraud measure: proscription of an 
intentional and material false statement, made with the intent of 
misleading the listener, which succeeds in doing so.291 This proposed 
amendment would address the First Amendment concerns surrounding 
proscription of false statements and would still effectively combat non-
pecuniary harms associated with false claims of military honors. 
B. The SVA Satisfies the Other Madigan Factors and Conforms with 
Other First Amendment Mandates 
Although the SVA fails to require actual reliance, the Act as written 
satisfies the remaining Madigan factors defining a constitutional anti-
fraud statute.292 Additionally, the SVA conforms to other First 
Amendment mandates because it does not chill protected speech293 and 
does not regulate speech based upon the viewpoint of the speaker.294 
                                                     
287. Id. at 372. 
288. Id. 
289. See supra notes 52–65 and accompanying text. 
290. United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943). 
291. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003); see also 
supra Part II.C. 
292. In addition to reliance, Madigan requires a knowing and material false statement, made with 
the intent to mislead the listener. Id. 
293. For a discussion of chilling protected speech, see supra notes 138–144 and accompanying 
text. 
294. For a discussion of regulations based on viewpoint, see supra notes 145–154 and 
accompanying text. 
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1. The SVA Can Be Construed to Prohibit Only Intentional and 
Material False Statements Intended to Defraud the Listener 
The Madigan Court defined a fraudulent statement as one that is 
intentionally misleading, knowingly false, material, and induces reliance 
on the part of the listener.295 The SVA provides criminal penalties for 
anyone who “falsely represents . . . to have been awarded any decoration 
or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United 
States . . . .”296 With the exception of actual reliance, the plain language 
of this provision comports with Madigan’s definition of a fraudulent 
statement. 
The SVA’s proscription of false representations of military honors 
satisfies Madigan’s requirement of an intentionally misleading, 
knowingly false statement. Webster’s Third International Dictionary 
defines “falsely” as either dishonestly or deceitfully.297 Webster’s 
defines “represent” as “to bring clearly before the mind: cause to be 
known, felt, or apprehended.”298 Similarly, the Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED) defines “falsely” as “[w]rongfully . . . [d]ishonestly, 
fraudulently . . . [d]eceitfully, [or] treacherously.”299 The OED defines 
“represent” as “[t]o bring clearly and distinctly before the mind . . . [or] 
to state or point out explicitly or seriously to one, with a view to 
influencing action or conduct.”300 Taken together, these definitions 
support several conclusions. First, “false” speech, defined either as 
dishonest or deceitful,301 is inherently intentional. The definitions of 
“represent” require the actor to bring a concept clearly before the mind 
of the listener, requiring purposeful conduct.302 Other definitions support 
this concept of intentional conduct. Webster’s states that when an actor 
“represents” he or she causes the concept to be known.303 Further, the 
OED’s definition requires the actor to “state or point out explicitly or 
                                                     
295. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 620. See supra Part II.C for full discussion of Madigan and its 
requirements. 
296. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
297. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 819 (2002). 
298. Id. at 1926. 
299. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 50 (1933). 
300. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 479 (1933) (emphasis added). 
301. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 299; WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY, supra note 297, at 819. 
302. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 300; WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY, supra note 297, at 1926. 
303. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 297, at 1926. 
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seriously.”304 Second, the actor must speak with a certain level of malice. 
False speech is variously characterized as dishonest or deceitful.305 
Either characterization suggests that one who “falsely represents” a 
fact—such as receipt of a military decoration—does so with malicious 
intent to deceive the listener. Third, not only does the statutory language 
suggest a requirement of intent to deceive, it also supports a requirement 
for intent to defraud.306 This flows not only from the OED definition, 
wherein “represent” encompasses statements made “with a view to 
influencing action or conduct,”307 but also from the intent of deceitful 
statements. Thus, “falsely represent” logically requires a knowingly false 
statement that is intended to mislead or deceive the listener. 
The SVA’s subject matter—military honors—satisfies the materiality 
requirement. A material statement must have some tendency or 
capability to entice the listener to alter their behavior.308 Military honors 
symbolize significant historical and character details, which can and do 
influence individuals.309 Therefore, because the SVA proscribes false 
statements about military honors, it satisfies Madigan’s materiality 
requirement. 
2. The SVA Neither Chills Protected Speech Nor Discriminates Based 
upon the Viewpoint of the Speaker 
In addition to addressing the remaining Madigan factors defining a 
constitutional anti-fraud statute, the SVA conforms to other First 
Amendment mandates by proscribing a small subset of autobiographical 
speech and doing so without regard for the viewpoint of the speaker. The 
First Amendment does not tolerate vague proscriptions on speech 
because such action inhibits individuals from engaging in protected 
speech activities for fear of criminal prosecution.310 However, the SVA 
                                                     
304. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 300. 
305. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 299; WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY, supra note 297, at 819. 
306. As noted by the Fifth Circuit, “[i]ntent to deceive and intent to defraud are not synonymous. 
Deceive is to cause to believe the false or to mislead. Defraud is to deprive of some right, interest or 
property by deceit.” United States v. Godwin, 566 F.2d 975, 976 (5th Cir. 1978). 
307. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 300. 
308. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (“The statement must have ‘a natural 
tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to 
which it was addressed.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 
770 (1988)). 
309. See supra Part I. 
310. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997); see also supra notes 138–144 and 
accompanying text. 
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is unlikely to suffer from this constitutional defect, as it proscribes a 
narrow band of knowingly false speech.311 The line between permissible 
and proscribable speech is also fairly clear, in that the underlying facts 
(i.e., whether the speaker has been awarded a particular military 
decoration) would be known by the speaker who violates the SVA.312 
Therefore, given the nature of the speech targeted by the SVA, it is 
unlikely that SVA prosecution would chill otherwise protected speech 
because the speakers are fully aware of the truth or falsity of their 
speech. 
Similarly, although the SVA regulates the subject matter of speech 
(i.e., receipt of military honors), it does not target a particular 
viewpoint.313 Because the SVA applies equally to all actors in all 
settings, it does not provide a vehicle for government suppression of 
particular points of view.314 False claims are prosecutable under the SVA 
regardless of the speaker’s stance on military service or other political 
views.315 Thus, although the SVA regulates content, it does so “such that 
there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is 
afoot.”316 
Because the SVA is not likely to chill protected speech, and because 
it does not regulate speech based on the viewpoint of the speaker, it 
satisfies the First Amendment mandates for all speech, even 
“unprotected” speech that is otherwise subject to government 
regulation.317 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the SVA to protect against “fraudulent claims” of 
                                                     
311. See supra notes 297–307 and accompanying text (advocating construing the SVA to require 
a knowing and intentional statement).  
312. Volokh, supra note 143, at 352. 
313. Id. at 354 (“False claims of military honors are not limited to any particular viewpoints, or 
even particular topics of debate.”). 
314. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006) (requiring only a false representation of receipt of a military 
award, regardless of context). 
315. Volokh, supra note 143, at 354; cf. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62–63 (1970) 
(stating the First Amendment prohibits the conditional use of a military uniform because of the 
potential for viewpoint discrimination); LightHawk, the Envtl. Air Force v. Robertson, 812 F. Supp. 
1095, 1102 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (suggesting that the First Amendment does not tolerate conditioning 
the use of a government symbol based upon the viewpoint of the speaker). 
316. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992). 
317. See supra notes 135–155 and accompanying text; see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (noting 
that the government cannot use a permissible regulation of speech, such as obscenity, to bootstrap 
an impermissible viewpoint restriction, such as prohibiting only obscene political messages).  
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military decorations because such claims devalue the reputation and 
meaning of the medals.318 In doing so, Congress recognized the 
symbolic power of military decorations and the potential for harm from 
false claims of military honors.319 However, because the SVA directly 
regulates speech, it must comply with the requirements of the First 
Amendment by either passing strict scrutiny or by regulating only a 
narrow category of speech such as fraud. The SVA satisfies many of the 
requirements of an anti-fraud statute, but it fails to require reliance on 
the part of the listener. 
Fortunately, the SVA’s constitutional infirmities are easily remedied. 
Congress need only amend the Act to prove reliance on the part of the 
listener. Moreover, Congress need not require any showing of pecuniary 
injury. By making this slight modification to the SVA, Congress would 
cure the Act’s constitutional issues and yet still protect the public against 
fraudsters who would misappropriate military honors to inflict a variety 
of harms. 
 
                                                     
318. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2, 120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006). 
319. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S12,688 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Conrad). 
(“These imposters use fake medals—or claim to have medals that they have not earned—to gain 
credibility in their communities. These fraudulent acts can often lead to the perpetration of very 
serious crimes.”). 
